

The Impersonal Superadditive Cosmology

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The impersonal: Superadditive Cosmology — Zornitsa Dimitrova

This article positions the concept of the event within a cosmology that affirms its status as an underlying liminality that precedes being yet is additive to the processes that constitute ontological regions. Across a number of event theories, the article shows how the event is systematically defined as an impassive extra-ontological entity that is external in its relation to being yet conditions its emergence. That is to say, the discussed event theories create a world picture in which the event is the impersonal superaddition to being. An event here is the intermediary, the interface, the groundlessness between world regions. As such, it functions as an extra-categorical element within being. Herein the impersonal event becomes the protagonist of a superadditive cosmology wherein it conditions the very emergence of constituted entities. The event becomes the impassive linkage between regions of being (Martin Heidegger), or the realm preceding, underlying, and generating being (Alfred North Whitehead and Gilles Deleuze). In what follows, then, I look at the story of the event from a cosmological vantage point and explore this pre-personal superadditive status.

An interview from 1988 later published in *Negotiations* documents one of Deleuze's long-standing fascinations: «I've tried in all my books to discover the nature of events. It's a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting the verb 'to be' and all its attributes» (Deleuze 1995, 141). At the same time, one is unable to formulate a uniform, systematic theory of the event. The concept remains invariably present but under different guises, explained in divergent terminologies or contemplated from different access points. 'Sense', 'sense-event', 'event of sense', 'the expressed' and even 'expression' are the terms that come to the fore most often. On contemplating the diffuse deleuzian event, I find a scope of borrowings and infusions from neighboring philosophical discussions that is striking. At the same time, leading event theories share many of Deleuze's ideas about the ontological portrait of events as impersonal underlying forces that condition the genesis of representation. The ontological priority and relational nature of "appropriation" in Heidegger and Whitehead's "ingression" all constellationally intertwine to form a unified concept. Rather than being a radically new monolithic mould, however, this concept takes shape out of the conjunction points between existing event theories and articulated intuitions about the nature of events. A similar line of thought follows Sean Bowden in *The Priority of Events*, ultimately arguing that Deleuze constructs the ontologically primitive event by extracting problems from «a hybrid family of concepts» (Bowden 2011, 244). In this book, Deleuze's borrowings from the Stoics, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Albert Lautman, Gilbert Simondon, structuralism, and psychoanalysis come to light. The red thread, however, remains the demonstration that events are impersonal ontological antecedents, that is to say, that substance entirely derives from them.

Let us look at one definition of the event: «The event is specifically the cut of production or becoming, what creates or generates something new» (Crockett 2013, 59). This definition sees the event of sense as a freeze-frame of a constitutive motion toward a novelty, the critical mass reached in a generative procedure, the brink of emergence. Apart from a processual definition, however, the event sports a number of characteristics that position it within a cosmology that affirms its impersonal status as an underlying liminality that conditions both the order of representation and its effects. The present paper extracts these, across a number of event theories, and shows how the event is systematically defined as an impassive extra-ontological entity through its relation to being. In doing this, I show how the event is construed in terms of its liminal and pre-personal status. That is to say, the discussed event theories create a world picture in which the event is the impersonal superaddition to being, signaling that we have reached the brink of emergence, but also the constitution of the order of representation. An event here is the intermediary, the interface, the groundlessness between world regions, the in-between, or the extra-categorical element. In this way, the impersonal event becomes the protagonist of a superadditive cosmology wherein it conditions the very emergence of constituted entities. Herein, the event becomes the impassive linkage between regions of being (Heidegger), or the realm preceding, underlying, and generating being (Whitehead and Deleuze). In what follows, then, I look at the story of the event of sense from a cosmological vantage point and explore this pre-personal superadditive status.

Ereignis in Heidegger: The Event of Appropriation

Let me begin with a philosophy that posits the event in the same realm as its groundwork of emergence – be it substance, being, or a world region. It is questionable whether Heidegger's '*Ereignis*' could be translated or interpreted as 'event' at all. Yet the term manifests several characteristics that bear a close resemblance to Deleuze's '*événement*'. Heidegger's '*Ereignis*', understood as 'appropriation', already demonstrates the relational and emergent features of Deleuze's event. Viewed in the light of Heidegger's ontological questioning, it would not be counterintuitive to posit '*Ereignis*' as the opening, cleavage, and clearing – all of them spatial terms – whereby being flashes itself into a world. A temporal tinge is given by the etymological proximity with '*Auge*' and '*Augenblick*' (see McNeill 2001), the showing of being in the blink of an eye. The various debates on the term's translation are myriad. 'Propriation' as favoured by Stuart Elden, 'appropriation', ¹ 'enowning', ² and 'the event of appropriation' ³ (Heidegger 1969, 31) touch on the "personal" component of being ("one's own"), but also on that of propriety. ⁴ An arguable reference to *Being and Time*'s terms '*Eigentlichkeit*' and '*Uneigentlichkeit*' (Heidegger 1996) also exists. ⁵ What is generally agreed upon, however, is that '*Ereignis*', itself an immediacy and a gesture of givenness, foregrounds a relationality.

In clarifying this, one could recall the lecture *On Time and Being* (1962; see Heidegger 1978). Here Heidegger makes clear that '*Ereignis*' does not offer yet another definition of being. What he asserts is that '*Ereignis*' «is to be thought in such a way that it can neither be retained as being nor as time. It is, so to speak, a "*neutrale tantum*", the neutral 'and' in the title *On Time and Being* (Heidegger 1978, 43). This impassive, non-belonging, intermediary and yet regulative character is also evident in the event in Deleuze. Moreover, as Heidegger's event as a moment of appropriation flashes through, a virtuality (being) is made actual (time). Hereby, being is contracted into a temporality, and the event of appropriation is the impassive force that carries the transition. The following passage throws light on Heidegger's decision to posit *Ereignis*, or appropriation, as the condition of possibility of an occurrence. Here it operates as the relational constituent that contracts being into a spatial and a temporal region, that is to say, into a finitudinal entity. It is at this point that *Ereignis*, a negotiator between the regions of a world, shows its liminal nature:

Ereignis will be translated as Appropriation or event of Appropriation. One should bear in mind, however, that "event" is not simply an occurrence, but that which makes any occurrence possible. What this word names can be

¹ This was the term used in the translation of the lecture *On Time and Being* (1962). See Heidegger (1978).

² In a translation proposed by Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad, this view on '*Ereignis*' foregrounds its property to arise, appear, come into one's self. The translation was applied in *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. See Heidegger (1999).

³ '*Ereignis*' as 'the event of appropriation' was the term chosen for Stambaugh's 1969 translation of the essay *The Principle of Identity*. '*Ereignis*' was introduced here for the first time. An earlier translation, Leidecker's *Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference* (1960) picks the term 'concern' as it alludes to a relational and yet distinguishing feature. This is highly interesting not least in view of the fact that Deleuze also insists on the status of his ontological protagonist, sense, as "the object of fundamental care" in *Logic of Sense*.

⁴ Here 'proprie' appears in the sense of "to give the truth of something".

⁵ In *Being and Time*, this dyad could be understood as 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity', but also as pertaining to '*Ereignis*' in its capacity to address the 'proper' and the 'improper' and thus grope at the same notion of 'propriety'.

thought now only in the light of what becomes manifest in our looking ahead toward Being and toward time as destiny and as extending, to which time and Being belong. We have called both — Being and time — matters. The 'and' between them left their relation to each other indeterminate. (19)

Here the ontological primacy of event over being which Deleuze makes central to his own work is already prefigured. The event is the ground of indetermination between being and time, but also that which contracts being into a (human) finitude, an impersonal intermediary that makes being personal. In addition, here Heidegger covertly hints at the event's status as an unnamable, as *Ereignis* does not manifest itself in being and does not belong to time. Rather, while touching on both and effecting a transmission, its status in relation to being and time remains undecided.

While the early work *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1996) offers a temporal scaffold of being that is primary to spatial relations, *Ereignis* from the later lectures constitutes a space dominant. As a spatial concept, it is defined not only as a locale, but also as the condition of possibility of a locality emerging between being and time – the locality that human finitude is. Here we have an example of something pre-personal – the impassive force of a relation – that creates a space for the emergence of finitudinal subjectivity. As has been recently shown, «Heidegger's notion of the event is first and foremost spatial: it denotes a site, a place of openness for the spatial differentiation and gathering of things, including human dwelling, to take place» (Joronen 2013, 627). In the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* (Heidegger 2001b), the notion of the fourfold constitution of *Ereignis*, the event of revealing, also carries traces of spatiality. Its manifestation as a clearing (*Lichtung*) is the result of the interplay of the constitutive elements of the fourfold – namely humans (finitude), unformed matter or substance (earth), paradigms (divinities), and the open (sky). Not only are these represented by spatial metaphors, but they also are reminiscent of Deleuze's locating the event on the brittle surface between the monsters of the depth and the daemons of the heights. It is on this surface that the divergent regions are appropriated and made available to one another. As a middle stretching toward two disparate regions, this surface also offers ground for the negotiation between the universal and the particular, the infinite and the individual.

Ereignis as appropriation, however, remains the leitmotif of the lecture *On Time and Being*. On providing the link between finitude and being, Heidegger offers a movement of transmission. The latter is «a non-static process» in which a relationship is established in such a way that the relation and the reciprocity issued therewith is «more fundamental than what is related» (Heidegger 1978, X). What Heidegger, following an attempt to think of being without beings, molds out of this is «an occurrence without reference to a thing occurring» (X). In this line of thought, the expression “appropriation appropriates” alludes to the impassive and transmitting character of the deleuzian event. *Ereignis* clears a space wherein finitude and the limitless can be appropriated for one another. Positing «Being as presence and [...] time as the realm of the open» (19), Heidegger lays out a region where they can belong together.

Appropriation ⁶ carries further characteristics of the impersonal and is described in similarly elusive language: «However: Appropriation neither is, nor is Appropriation there. [...] What remains to be

⁶ Similar to the event in Deleuze, appropriation appears to have engaged Heidegger increasingly over the years. This is documented in several earlier writings,

said? Only this: Appropriation appropriates» (24). In this passage, one increasingly begins to sense the proximity between Heidegger's "appropriation" and Deleuze's "*événement*". First, the event in Heidegger aligns with a certain manifestation of being, making the concept an ontological primate with regard to a world and its phenomena. Second, its relational role as an impassive transmissive component between two ontologically disparate regions is foregrounded and made primary too. Further still, this ontological primacy is underlined through the term's categorical distinctness from objects or properties ⁷ as well as from the terms it relates. Appropriation is not spatial, nor is it temporal, although it lends itself to descriptions through the mentioned terms. Neither is it a "thing". Appropriation is entirely immanent, as it remains within itself, and neutral, without serving as a point of reference or itself referencing anything beyond its own appropriative action.

While all this reminds us of Quentin Meillassoux's *After Finitude* and its attack on correlationism, a path toward the dissolution of that same correlationist stance opens here. 'Appropriation' offers a relation that is primarily defined through the act of relating. Heidegger couches his statement in platonist terms. He ultimately affirms that *Ereignis* is not of a phenomenal nature and cannot be thought in terms of phenomena. It has nothing to say about them. More importantly, Heidegger foregrounds the presence of appropriation as an impersonal force, that which presences, an openness that appears, a showing of a revelatory character. Rather than being the explication of what is already given, the relation of appropriation is dynamic, constituting a transmission and a gesture of production. It is within this impassive transmission that the regions of a world, but also finitude and being, become given to one another. The expressions "openness", "clearing", and "shining forth" poetically capture this givenness. They testify to the emergence of an order that is irrelevant to the world of phenomena, thus acquiring the status of an outside, yet an order which is immanent to or embedded in the given.

Heidegger's *Ereignis* thus shows itself as an impassive connective component that is other than being, yet facilitates an access to being and renders its region visible. It is construed as an openness between regions and the linkage between the universal and the particular, the infinite and finitude. The event's liminality becomes manifest in a spatiality trope: it is a "clearing" (*The Origin of the Work of Art*) and a "bridge" (*Building, Dwelling, Thinking*). In this capacity, it is systematically construed as an event of passage and a negotiator between disparate world regions. This relationality becomes the condition for the communication between divergent world regions to take place. At the same time, the event is different in texture from the world regions it brings together and in-

such as in *Letter on Humanism* (Heidegger 2010), a lecture course dated 1949 and bearing the name *Insight into That Which Is* and later published as the *The Thing* (see Heidegger 2001c) and *Das Gestell* [*Lectures and Essays* (1954)], as well as in *Identity and Difference* (Heidegger 1969).

⁷ In his account of contemporary continental philosophy, D'Amico (1999) reminds us that the question of *Dasein* is indifferent to questions of truth and falseness as encountered in the world (which Deleuze terms "denotation"). The question of representation, he notes, remains an ontic one, that is to say, one that does not help us in encountering being. In a sense, Deleuze's notion of the event as indifferent to reference-informed notions of truth replicates this move. This becomes all the more visible if we view D'Amico's statement through the lenses of Bowden's thesis about the ontological priority of events: «Global skepticism concerning whether access to the external world is even possible, let alone reliable, is an ontic topic. Heidegger thinks any worries about these physical processes leave the question of being unanswered, since that question neither depends upon nor presupposes reliable access. For instance, the possibility that representations of the world might "misfire" due to deviant causal processes is not an ontological problem, though it may be a significant ontic one. Even given such a massive misfire, *Dasein* encounters being. [...] [F]undamental ontology is prior to epistemology» (D'Amico 1999, 60).

forms. It differs from the worlds to which it relates, becoming their superaddition. From this position, it is not determined in terms of world regions, nor does it pertain to world regions in the proper sense. The event of appropriation is an impersonal force solely defined by its appropriative action and its role as a passage for being.

Whitehead and the Locus of Creation

Yet another event cosmology presents itself in the section “What is an event?” of Deleuze’s *The Fold* (1993, 76–85). Here Deleuze explicitly names one antecedent of his event theory, Whitehead. Rather than dealing with temporal and relational aspects of the term as in *The Logic of Sense*, this inquiry probes into a positive description as well as into the conditions of possibility of an event. On stating that events are «produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition that a sort of screen intervenes» (76), the philosopher takes us back to *Logic*’s notion of the genesis of representation. It is the subtle transformative coloration of the impassive event – a change of state, an alteration following an action – that preconditions the emergence of a world region. “Chaotic multiplicities” are organized by virtue of this screen, «a formless elastic membrane, an electromagnetic field» (76). This transformative component recomposes bodies and the multiplicity of interrelations into which bodies enter, the result being a singular occurrence.

Exactly this switch from the universal (chaotic multiplicity) to the particular (finitude) engages Deleuze. Again, what perplexes is the participatory role of the event: it is immanent to each particularity, yet leaving it individual and distinct. The paradox of being simultaneously *within* and *without* becomes manifest yet again. Herein Spinoza’s solution to theological debates about the transition from substance to finite modes, from one to many, comes to the fore. This query, in its most abstract form, translates into the event structure as a cosmological given. Rather than following a line of descent from substance to finite modes, Deleuze chooses to start from the pre-representational “depths” as «series of wholes and parts that appear chaotic to us» (76). These are regions of pre-propositional, pre-reflective bodily interfusions: «Chaos would be a pure Many, a purely disjunctive diversity, while the something is a One, not a pregiven unity, but instead the indefinite article that designates a certain singularity» (76). This chaos is a pure possibility, a sum of potent essences striving toward existence, a pre-personal realm of ongoing constitution. Herein, what comes to the fore is a screen out of which the multitude of chaos becomes individuated to finally consolidate into a maximally concrete entity, a thisness. A “metaphysical surface” (Deleuze 1990, 125), a “transcendental field” (102) or “a plane of immanence” (Deleuze & Parnet 1977, 147) are the guises under which this differential screen of the impersonal event operates. The deleuzian screen carries the event’s transformative faculty and extracts particulars out of the virtual.

This notion of events as intermediaries between one and many, universals and particulars, substance and finite modes, or bodily mixtures and propositions is infinitely liberating inasmuch as it postulates that the impersonal event is the basic condition for an emergence within a world. According to this view, evental regions are the sieve through which the undifferentiated “depthless shadows” of potentiality are made actual. A non-existent subsistence, the deleuzian event appears to pose as a condition of possibility for all existent enti-

ties. According to this model, all finite modes within a world, having undergone the process of the expression of substance, constitute events. Unlike other influential theories that enlist essential transformation, uniqueness, or significance as the prerequisites for an event, within this cosmology everything is an event. Namely, actualized entities are inherently transformative, unique, and significant.

Evading a scenario of non-differentiation requires a distinction that would allow the event to encompass everything, but still allow for differences. In working out this quandary, Deleuze introduces two components borrowed from Whitehead. They are extension and intension. The former is an element that Deleuze (1993, 77) detects in both Whitehead's and Leibniz's definitions of the event. Extension is the stretching of one component over a series of components. It ensures continuity within an entity by dint of gluing together various stages of individuation. Intension, in turn, brings forth Spinoza's notion of power as a question of degrees or intensity.⁸ Thus, the event extends down the chain toward the constitution of individual entities until the motion arrives at the finitudinal. On motioning toward greater concreteness, the event becomes a matter of degrees, a fixture of an existent's intensity. Here one encounters degrees of "thisnesses", that is, entities which are distinct from one another insofar as they demonstrate different levels of definiteness and intensity. While extensions safeguard the rule of univocity, intensions supply definiteness at every step. Having descended to the finite modes, the virtual substance has become more pronounced. A thing has become *this* thing, «no longer the indefinite article, but the demonstrative pronoun» (78).

⁸ See the section "What Can A Body Do?" (Deleuze 2005, 217-235).

Once the movement has reached this stage of definiteness, Deleuze evokes Whitehead's theory of prehensions. With this, a transition from definiteness to the personal takes place. This transition shows how an existent entity can participate in substance, be itself composed of parts (properties) that guarantee its distinctness, and simultaneously generate an extra component. Metaphorically speaking, this extra component is another intermediary between the actual entity and the expression of its potentiality in the substance. "Prehension" offers a further level of individuation that can be described as the awareness of "being given". It also entails an entity's recognition of a given that simultaneously also participates in the onto-phenomenological awareness: «It is the element of pure givenness in this act; experience as the having of an object» (Hartshorne 1963, 167). This moment confirms the relational character of an event since an entity is always prehended by others and itself prehends.

Apart from being a sum of its relations to given entities that it prehends, a prehended particularity also entails a link between the past of the prehended and its present set of relations. This concoction of "causal efficacy" and "connectedness", in which «the occurrence of events strictly entails that of those events which theyprehend» (169) amounts to the actuality of a particular event. It, however, offers a unique, personal way of unifying the many prehensions of past experiences into a new actual One. This act, to Whitehead, is not deterministic, but creative. Here Whitehead demonstrates how the evolvement of substance from one to many reaches a phase of involvement wherein a second movement, from many to one, carries on, but on the level of a substance that is far more refined and individuated. This process overlaps with deleuzian "becoming" (Deleuze 1993, 78).

At this point, the movement of the event has arrived at its most actual and individualized form. Then, the phase of substance's evolvment is concluded by allowing the many to fold back into a one – this time a highly differentiated, creatively generated one. Here Deleuze points out another faculty of the event. Speaking with Whitehead, he calls this faculty an “ingression”, describing the inclusion of impassive “eternal objects” in the now maximally concretized event structure:

While prehensions are always current forms (a prehension is a potential only in respect to another current prehension), eternal objects are pure Possibilities that are realized in fluvia, but also pure Virtualities that are actualized in prehensions. That is why a prehension does not grasp other prehensions without apprehending eternal objects (properly, conceptual feeling). Eternal objects produce ingression in the event. (79)

Actuality or discreteness is now pervaded by an element that could be called either a whiteheadian “eternal object” or deleuzian “virtuality”, inasmuch as it evokes “pure potentials” or “potentials for the process of becoming” (Whitehead 1985, 29). Each actual occurrence implies the actualization of certain potentialities. In this arrangement, actual entities are marked by the “ingression” of selected eternal objects: «The term ‘ingression’ refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity» (23).

It is at these points of intersection that an event emerges. A most concrete individual entity takes shape, having folded the multiplicity back into a new, creatively constituted one. Once its relations as a prehended entity and a cluster of the objects it prehends are established within the flux of becoming-actual, these entities are also pervaded by virtual eternal objects which become additive to their definiteness. They, however, are optional in character. An ingression may or may not occur. In other words, one could call an eternal object the entity's *superaddi*,⁹ the impersonal component that further enriches or defines its particular character without being necessary to its formation. This move implies a double logic of simultaneous immanence and transcendence. On the one hand, the conceptual abstractions, universals or virtualities that the eternal objects are, appear to pervade the individual entities from “without”, that is, «pure Virtualities that are actualised in prehensions» (Deleuze 1993, 79). On the other hand, the eternal objects are not aprioristic inasmuch as they are immanent to the flux of prehensions that experience is. In this sense, they are to remain strictly “within”.

A double movement is formed in this way. First, we have the movement from impassive virtualities to most concrete finite modes, an act within which substance evolves expressing itself. Substance descends from indeterminacy toward the most concrete, personal determination. A counteracting movement also issues forth, however. Opposite to the movement from one to many, from potentiality to actuality, actualization follows a trajectory of involvement, contracting the many into one. The impassive “eternal objects” play a vital role here as they are, in turn, the expressions of the derived actualities. At this intersection, deleuzian events surface again in the process of actualization. They do

⁹ See Agamben's discussion on the definition of beatitude in Duns Scotus in the excursus *Halos* (Agamben, 2003a).

so not as actualizations – as the incorporation of the virtual into the actual, the universal into the particular and so on – but in the form of supra-existents or superadditive subsistences. In representing the “envisagement” of eternal objects (Whitehead 1985, 44), they gesture back toward the virtualities.

Deleuzian events emerge out of this paradoxical point of intersection between “within” and “without” as «instantaneous productions intrinsic to interactions between various kinds of forces» (Stagoll 2005, 89) and «changes [...] subsisting as pure virtualities» (89) distinguishable only insofar as they can be incarnated in a body or a state. Events here are the articulation of the difference between transcendence and immanence insofar as they occur on an interface that marks the entering of eternal objects into the flux of experience (“withoutness”), whereby experience itself is a multiplicity of interrelated prehensions (“withinness”). This infusion of potentials (or forms and patterns) into an already maximally concretized entity can be described in the terminology of Duns Scotus. It is a “halo”, an impersonal superadditive component whose character is not substantial, but rather that of an enhancement, an intensification. Metaphorically speaking, in receiving eternal objects, the finitudinal gestures back to the forms and potentials in a way that reminds us of the inherence of the deleuzian event: «An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world» (Whitehead 1985, 44). Similarly, the event is neutrality itself, an impassive inherence, whereas only bodies remain impassioned and thus describable in terms of ethical evaluation. Switching to an ontological vocabulary and to Deleuze’s words, I can now additionally define an impassive event as a flush of potentialities into a substance taken to its maximal level of concreteness in the finite modes. There the event similarly “insists” and “subsists” while being non-actual, practically a non-existent. While maximally distinct, when illuminated by an event, an entity turns to beckon toward its virtuality.

The superadditive status of the event here shows itself on several levels. First, it is by dint of Whitehead’s “prehension” that relationality is secured in the process of individuation. Second, in the process of individuation, a generative motion from forms and potentials to finitude issues forth. Events, within this model, function as an impassive screen separating and articulating the difference between virtuality and actuality. Herein, they are the limit that marks an entity’s entry into being. Third, in “ingression” one confronts an actuality that gestures back toward the virtual region. In all three cases, we have to do with regions of emptiness. These impassive regions, while not pertaining to being, open up as a space for being’s articulation.

The Event and Its Cosmology

From this short collection of event ontologies, it becomes evident that two notions run across contesting theories. The first is the notion of impassive liminality. Herein, the ontological portrait of events is invariably marked by tropes alluding to a transmission, intermediariness, a passage, a transition, or a transformation indifferent to ‘corporeal’ world regions. As a cosmological category, the event itself becomes a carrier of intermediary characteristics. Across divergent event ontologies, the event is an empty centre that becomes a playground for the interfusions of finitude and the infinite. Heidegger makes the event the

capture of appropriative action, and Whitehead locates it on the screen separating virtual and actual. The second notion derives from the first and can be explained with the trope of the “superadditive”. In its relation to being, the event acts as a super-addition. It is non-existent, adjacent, non-essential to the flow of representation, yet constitutive of it as it makes a being that which it is.

Heidegger’s appropriation acts as a point of intersection between the regions of a world, but also as the place securing the continuity and transition between divergent worlds. Herein *Ereignis* positions itself as the condition of possibility of an occurrence. It is a neutral “and” negotiating a world’s disparate regions. While being and time are “matters”, the intermediary “and” regulates their relationship. Offering a ground of indeterminacy, it acts as an in-between and a messenger between worlds. *Ereignis* as appropriation thus puts on display both the primacy of the relation and the relation’s transmissive status as a backdrop of immanence. Against this backdrop, the disparate regions of a world become present to one another in the dynamic, non-referential transmission of a relation.

Encountered in Heidegger, this dynamic and motion-infused protagonist is also present in the event theories of Whitehead and Deleuze. Here the event is shown to “extend over” a region marking the transition from infinite substance to finite modes. An event’s potential to impart creativity is also located in the superadditive phenomena of becoming-intense (“intension”) and becoming-personal (“prehension”). Lastly, Whitehead’s “ingression”, the infusion of eternal objects or virtuality into an already actual entity, also affirms the kind of ontology governed by connective, relational, transmissive, and reciprocal properties. Herein an event operates as a “screen” by dint of which being is contracted into the finitudinal and multiplicities into the maximally individual. Virtual and actual coalesce while remaining open to one another.

According to the listed event ontologies, the event almost uniformly acts as an impersonal inherence thought of in relation to being, but not amounting to a form of being or being definable in ways that include being. Its status as an in-between, a non-existent, transformative, transmissive constituent and a relation could not be more emphasized throughout the discussed theories. Spatiotemporal, but not quite, a change in substance but not a substance itself, uniquely concrete, but also maximally abstract – the singular event is almost uniformly described in the language of apophatic theology. An event’s emergence is a condition for the emergence of a world. According to this understanding, everything is an event. Herewith the event becomes a cosmological category. This event assumes form on the intersection between universals and particulars wherein it gestures back to its own virtuality. The event is both “within” and “without”. As a liminal phenomenon, the event thus continually articulates the fissure between immanence and transcendence, “withinness” and “withoutness”.

The Superadditive

With the introduction of the superadditive, I offer a short exposition that has the aim to emphasize the constitutive role of impassivity and emptiness in this cosmology. According to this view, it is the vacuity between conceptual entities that adds up to the shaping of world regions. The place of an event’s occurrence is this nominal “groundlessness” between the disparate regions of the virtual and the actual. This position or, better still, non-position of the event of sense

can be aligned with Heidegger's image of a bridge as the gathering place for the fourfold in the essay *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* (Heidegger 2001a). Here, the paradox of the non-locatability of a location and the mutual conditioning of both constitutive components and constitution are brought to light:

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which a space is provided for. (Heidegger 2001a, 151-152)

Another way of coming closer to thinking this non-locatable locale, the event of sense, and the paradoxical relationship it maintains with the realms of virtuality and actuality, opens up with Giorgio Agamben's discussion in the excursus *Ease*. Here the author isolates "ease" as the proper name of this unrepresentable locale:

The term 'ease' in fact designates, according to its etymology, the space adjacent (ad-jacens, adjacentia), the empty place where each can move freely, in a semantic constellation where spatial proximity borders on opportune time (ad-agio, moving at ease) and convenience borders on the correct relation. The Provençal poets (whose songs first introduce the term into Romance languages in the form *aizi*, *aizimen*) make ease a terminus technicus in their poetics, designating the very place of love. Or better, it designates not so much the place of love, but rather love as the experience of taking-place in whatever singularity. (Agamben 2003b, 24-25)

Similarly, rather than attaching to a being, the event of sense takes place in an adjacent region, receiving infusions from and negotiating the ground between the realms of being and non-being. In seeing the event as an extra-being, the mentioned event ontologies reinstate its "adjacent" status in a manner similar to Agamben's treatment of the term 'ease'. Ease is the emptiness between bodies, yet this emptiness is a constitutive one. It transforms them and creates a groundlessness that facilitates an emergence. Herein, the event's double work as a "withinness" that simultaneously points beyond itself, a "withoutness", designates the very place where transformation occurs. This transformation is to be understood as an impersonal force, as the event of taking place of any haecceity. In other words, with regard to its actualization, the event of sense remains neutral while plunged in maximally concrete regions.

What an event effects, however, is across and beyond signification. Oftentimes it merely offers us a meinongian non-existing entity. Where events are most expressive, they ultimately fail to signify. In this way, events could be said to function as extra-beings or *superaddi*: «When nothing essential can be added [...] there is, however, something that can be added in surplus (*superaddi*),

an “accidental reward that is added to the essential”, that is not necessary to beatitude and does not alter it substantially, but that simply makes it more brilliant (*clarior*)” (54). Following the analogy taken from Giorgio Agamben’s essay *Halo* (Agamben 2003a), explaining the inessential but ultimately individuating character of a halo, let us recall the deleuzian rhetoric that surrounds the expressed and its additive, inessential, but world-shaping character:

The halo is not a *quid*, a property or an essence that is added to beatitude: It is an absolutely inessential supplement. [...] The halo is [...] the individuation of a beatitude, the becoming singular of that which is perfect. [...] [T]his individuation does not imply the addition of a new essence or a change in its nature, but rather its singular completion [...] the singularity here is not a final determination of being, but an unraveling or an undetermination of its limits: a paradoxical individuation by indetermination. [...] One can think of the halo, in this sense, as a zone in which possibility and reality, potentiality and actuality, become indistinguishable. The being that has reached its end and has thus consumed all of its possibilities thus receives as a gift a supplementary possibility. (55–56)

The expressed, very much like a halo, envelops representational world regions. It is supra-logical, non-corporeal, and evades structures of resemblance or recognition. A halo is what is most unnecessary, a *superaddi*, an excess of beatitude within an already complete being. Yet a halo is also what illuminates the being it is additive to, thus making *this* particular being shine forth. Similarly, an event is what is invisible, superfluous, and yet the one facet that gives a finishing edge to the given, despite its already available wholesomeness. The empty site of the event makes being not only more intensified but also truly creative – not only working within prefigured patterns, but exceeding them and becoming additive to the given. When incorporated in world regions, the event works as an incorporeal envelopment intensifying bodies, bringing them to what they can become.

Conclusion

This paper showed how the ontological portrait of the event was constructed in terms of impassivity and exclusion. The problematic classification of the evental region has made philosophers give it a status of an extra-ontological entity. Its habitat – outside of being – makes the event a messenger between worlds, an impersonal force that alters the fabric of being. The event disrupts the habitual texture of a given world region, and carries the transition between levels of being such as virtuality and actuality, the infinite and a finitude. The event is an intermediary, a negotiator between disparate world regions, and it is only in this connective activity that a world – an actualized entity – comes to being. At the same time, an event has the character of an anomaly as it cannot be peacefully incorporated into being. Rather than of being, the event is part of a superadditive cosmology. It attests to the groundlessness between world regions and to the constitutive zest of this groundlessness. Here, the becoming of being takes place in the impersonal, that is, in an extra-ontological adjacent region.

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